1. ‘[V]ictimisation was as serious a mischief as direct discrimination.’
Nagarajan v LRT [2001] AC 502 (HL), [79] (Lord Steyn).
Discuss whether the statutory definitions of victimisation and direct discrimination, as interpreted by the courts, reflect Lord Steyn’s view
2. Enda makes regular visits to his local gym, which is open to all. He walks with a slight limp, which does not prevent him using the gym and keeping reasonably fit, but it is enough to prevent him playing in competitive sports. His limp is not caused by a recognised clinical condition. The staff at the gym always ‘teased’ Enda about his limp, referring to him as ‘hop-along’, ‘clodhopper’, and ‘spastic’. Enda joins in with this, referring to himself in the same terms. He does this only to maintain a reasonable relationship with the staff, as he does not want to be seen as confrontational and wants to ‘fit in’. After a year of this, Enda stopped going to the gym because he was becoming too upset by the ‘teasing’.
Advise Enda as to any rights he may have against the gym under the Equality Act 2010.
3. Albert owns a house-building firm. At one building site, he advertised for labourers. Sandy applied, and was invited for an interview. Albert was surprised to see that Sandy was a woman, and stated, ‘This is physically demanding work, and full of men’s “locker room talk”‘ (course and foul talk of a sexual nature). Albert continued, ‘That’s no place for a pretty thing like you.’ Albert rejected Sandy’s application, but offered her a (better paid) secretarial job in the site office. Sandy declined. Sandy is an ultra-fit triathlete and wanted the job to improve her fitness.
Albert also advertised for a night security guard, to patrol the site at night and weekends. Ranjit applied but was rejected because he refused to wear the uniform cap; this was because his (Sikh) religion dictated he should wear a turban. Albert insists that his guards wear the cap, so that they are instantly recognisable.
Advise Sandy and Ranjit as to any claims they may have under the Equality Act 2010.
4. ‘[T]he proscribed grounds in article 14 cannot be unlimited, otherwise the wording of article 14 referring to “other status” beyond the well-established proscribed grounds, including things such as sex, race or colour, would be unnecessary. It would then preclude discrimination on any ground. That is plainly not the meaning of article 14.’
R. (S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2004] 1 WLR 2196 [48] (Lord Steyn).
Critically discuss how far you agree with this statement.


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